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Talent Matters: 
 
Judicial Productivity and Speed in Japan 
 
 
By J. Mark Ramseyer* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Abstract:  To study the determinants of judicial productivity and speed 
(measured by published opinions), I examine all 348 trial-court civil medical malpractice 
opinions published in Japan between 1995 and 2004.  For comparative purposes, I add 
120 randomly selected civil judgments from the same period.  The data cover 706 judges 
(about a third of the Japanese bench).  I find:  (A) Productivity correlates with apparent 
intellectual ability and effort.  The judges who attended the most selective universities, 
who passed the bar exam most quickly, and who were chosen by the courts for an elite 
career track publish the most opinions.  (B) Adjudicatory speed correlates with apparent 
ability and effort too, but institutional experience counts as well.  As the courts acquired 
increasing experience with malpractice cases, the pace of adjudication quickened. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * Mitsubishi Professor of Japanese Legal Studies, Harvard University.  I received helpful 
comments and suggestions from Tom Ginsburg, Richard Posner, and Frances Rosenbluth. 
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Talent Matters: 
 
Judicial Productivity and Speed in Japan 
© J. Mark Ramseyer 
 
 
 Using data from Japan, I examine judge-level determinants of productivity 
(defined as opinions published per year) and speed (time from filing to judgment) in the 
courts.  Toward that end, I collect all 348 district-court civil medical malpractice opinions 
published in any reporter between 1995 and 2004.  For comparison, I add 120 randomly 
selected civil judgments from the same period.  The resulting dataset covers 706 judges, 
or not quite a third of the Japanese bench.  For reasons of data availability, I limit the 
study to published opinions.   
 I find that talent matters.  First, productivity correlates with apparent intellectual 
ability and effort.  The judges who attended the most selective universities, who passed 
the bar exam most quickly, and who were chosen by the courts for an elite career track 
write the most published opinions.  Second, adjudicatory speed correlates with apparent 
ability and effort too.  Again, the most talented judges decide cases more quickly than the 
others.  Institutional experience matters as well, however.  As the courts acquired 
experience with malpractice cases, the speed at which they handled the cases increased as 
well. 
 Note several preliminary but basic qualifications.  I do not measure "judicial 
efficiency" itself.  Any inquiry into the efficiency of an institutional arrangement involves 
an inquiry into its costs as well as its performance.  The costs here include price -- for the 
judge-level characteristics that (according to this study) correlate with productivity and 
speed are exactly the characteristics that Nakazato, Ramseyer & Rasmusen (2010) find 
correlate with high incomes in the private bar.  The better the judge, the higher his 
shadow wage.  Japanese courts might increase productivity and speed by hiring more 
talented judges, but they would need to pay higher salaries to attract them.   
 In turn, performance involves more than productivity and speed.  It also involves 
adjudicatory quality.  Unfortunately, I lack the information to gauge the quality either of 
the trials conducted or of the opinions written.  Because Japanese judges rarely cite other 
cases, I cannot replicate the citation studies used in the U.S. either.   
 And productivity involves more than published opinions.  Although Japanese 
judges write opinions in all cases they decide (civil cases do not involve juries), (a) the 
reporters publish only a minority of opinions, and (b) many cases settle before a judge 
writes any opinion at all.  Some high-quality judges might (only might) regularly route 
disputants into settlement at an early stage.  Alas, Japanese courts do not disclose judge-
level information about either the total number of cases decided (whether published or 
unpublished), or the total number of cases settled out of court.   
 One must start somewhere.  Subject to these very real qualifications, I offer an 
examination of the judge-level determinants both (i) of the number of opinions a judge 
publishes each year, and (ii) of the time it takes him to issue them.  I begin by reviewing 
the literature on judicial productivity and speed, and describe the Japanese court system 
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(Section I).  I discuss my data and variables (Section II).  I then summarize the results 
(Sections III through V). 
 
I.  Introduction   
A.  Literature Review:
 Only recently have scholars begun to study the determinants of judicial 
performance.  In three studies, they reach conclusions about the U.S. courts consistent 
with the findings I report here.  Landes, Lessig & Solimine (1998: 321) explore citation 
patterns in the federal courts.  They find that judges from elite law schools and judges 
with law school honors write opinions that are cited more often than others.  Christensen 
& Szmer (2009) examine delays.  They find both that more experienced judges are 
slower (they attribute it to "burn-out"), and that graduates of elite law schools are faster.  
Choi, Gulati & Posner (2010) study the determinants of published opinions among U.S. 
district court judges.  They find that graduates of elite law schools publish more. 
 Other empirically inclined scholars have taken a variety of tacks.  As an 
alternative to simple citation studies, Klein & Morrisroe (1999) examine references to the 
name of a judge as a measure of his prestige.  They do not, however, try to predict 
prestige with judge-level variables.  Bhattacharya & Smyth (2001) use Klein & 
Morrisroe's prestige metric to study the Australian courts.  They conclude that younger 
and more conservative judges have more influence.   
 Cauthen & latzer (2008), Binford, et al. (2007), Cecil (1985), and Lindquist 
(2007) explore the determinants of judicial delays but do not consider the characteristics 
of individual judges.  Songer (1988) and Hettinger, Lindquist & Martinek (2006) 
consider judge-level factors, but only those related to politics.  Beenstock & Haitovsky 
(2004) examine the relation between judicial productivity and caseload in Israeli courts.  
They conclude that judges respond to lower caseloads by working less.  Using U.S. data 
on judicial vacancies, Binder & Matlzman (2009: 132-33) reach the opposite conclusion. 
 
B.  Japan:
 Ironically, the bureaucratic nature of the Japanese courts may facilitate the study 
of the impact of judicial talent on performance.1  The administrative office of the courts 
(the "Secretariat") hires judges who closely resemble each other on many dimensions.  
That essential similarity magnifies the effect of the dimensions on which they do differ, 
and in this article I focus the impact of those remaining characteristics. 
 The Secretariat appoints its recruits immediately after they graduate from the one 
national law school, the Legal Research & Training Institute (LRTI).2  Although critics 
urge it to hire practicing lawyers, to date it has seldom done so.  The LRTI, in turn, 
admits students on the basis of a (mostly blindly graded) annual examination.  During the 
period in question (the system recently changed), the pass rate on this exam hovered 
below 3 percent.  Most people who took it never passed, and those who did typically 
passed only after failing it five or six times first.   
                     
1 I take this description from Ramseyer & Rasmusen (2003).  A nice description of the system 
appears in Law (2009). 
2 The system recently changed.  Japanese universities now offer graduate-level professionally 
oriented "law schools."  Most sudents currently enter the LRTI only after time in these post-graduate "law 
schools."  See generally West (2007). 
Talent Matters:  Page 4 
 Students in Japan who would become lawyers, judges, or prosecutors usually 
studied law as an undergraduate subject.  They then took the entrance examination to the 
LRTI.  If they passed, they studied there for two years (recently changed).  Upon 
graduation, they took jobs in private practice, on the bench, or in the prosecutorial office.  
Those who never passed typically worked in the legal departments of the large 
corporations.   
 Most years, the Secretariat hired 70 to 130 new judges a year.  Over the course of 
their careers, these judges moved through a series of appointments, generally at three-
year intervals.  Virtually all of them spent some time in courts considered undesirable, 
and virtually all also spent time in coveted Tokyo or Osaka appointments.  The more 
talented the judge, the more time he spent in urban courts.  The more plebian his abilities, 
the longer he worked in the outback.3   
  
II.  Data and Variables
A.  Data: 
 1.  Introduction. -- As in the U.S., so in Japan:  the time a judge needs to decide a 
case depends on the type of dispute.  The days he needs to hear evidence, study the law, 
decide motions, and write an opinion all vary by field.  In some fields, litigants call many 
witnesses; in others they use almost none.  Some types of cases raise complex technical 
issues; others are simple.  Some include new and unsettled questions; others follow 
established precedent. 
 To hold constant this field-specific variation, I focus on one closely defined group 
of disputes:  medical malpractice.  I search for "medical malpractice" in the "Hanrei 
taikei" database (a Japanese equivalent to Lexis or Westlaw), and code every district 
court opinion published in some venue (either a public or commercial reporter) from 
1995 to 2004.4  This yields 351 opinions.  I drop the three criminal cases, and focus on 
the resulting 348 civil decisions.  Because most (not all) of these cases involve three-
judge panels, this process produces 926 judge-case observations.  Because many judges 
published multiple malpractice opinions, it generates a dataset with 706 judges  
 
 2.  Biases. -- As alluded to above, this approach introduces several biases.  First, 
we have known at least since Priest & Klein (1984) that litigated cases -- whether 
published or no -- are not a random sample of all disputes.  Instead, they constitute those 
disputes that the parties chose not to settle out-of-court.  If some judges facilitate 
settlement more effectively than others, they will appear less often in my published-
opinion database.   
 What is more, the various court reporters never publish most opinions.  In 2004, 
they included only 1.9 percent (1,358) of all civil judgments.  If I exclude default 
judgments, they published 3.0 percent (from Hanrei taikei data base; Shiho tokei, 2004:  
tab. 20).  They do publish a larger fraction of malpractice opinions, but even here they 
                     
3 I do not consider the politics of this arrangement here.  The subject is discussed at length in 
Ramseyer & Rasmusen (2003), Ramseyer & Rasmusen (2006), Ramseyer (2008), and Ramseyer (2009).  
For the controversy over the possible politicization of the Japanese courts, see Haley (2007) and Upham 
(2005). 
4 That is, under "jiko," I search for "iryo kago."  Hanrei taikei is published by the Dai-ichi hoki 
firm.  Eighteen cases that appeared in the search were dropped as not involving malpractice. 
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pick only a minority.  From 1998 to 2004, the Japanese courts issued 2,298 civil 
judgments in medical malpractice cases (summing Table 1 Column (3)).  During the 
same period, the reporters published only 229 (10.0 percent). 
 [Insert Table 1 about here.] 
 Given that the Japanese courts employ about 2,000-2,500 career (i.e., non-
summary-court) judges, my dataset samples about one in three.  Because I select the 
judges from those who published opinions, I obviously bias the sample against those 
judges who settle disputes or write only unpublished decisions.  To investigate the scope 
of this bias, I collect biographical information on all 89 judges who graduated from the 
LRTI in 1976.  As appropriate, I compare the basic malpractice dataset against these 
1976 judges.   
 Second, medical malpractice cases differ systematically from other civil suits:  
they involve higher stakes, more difficult factual questions, and (at least in the early 
1990s) more novel legal issues.  To investigate these potential biases, I code twelve 
randomly selected civil damage actions from each year from 1995 to 2004.5  Here too, I 
rely on the Hanrei taikei database.  I again compare the judges from this dataset to the 
malpractice judges as appropriate. 
 Third, publication venue could reflect a further bias.  The courts publish some 
Japanese opinions in their official reporters, while private commercial firms publish the 
rest.  Plausibly, the courts pick opinions with an eye toward the precedent they hope to 
encourage; the commercial reporters pick the opinions they think will sell magazine 
subscriptions.   
 The judges in this dataset are not -- at least in any obvious fashion -- tailoring 
their decisions for their effective supervisors in the Secretariat.  Of all the malpractice 
opinions they wrote, only fifteen appeared in the official reporters.  The rest appeared in 
the commercial reporters.   
 
B.  Variables: 
 I use these data to construct the following variables.  Summary statistics appear in 
Table 2. 
 [Insert Table 2 about here.] 
 
 1.  Case-level variables. --  
 Time-to-Judgment:  Number of years from the year of filing to the judgment. 
 Demand Value:  the total amount demanded by the plaintiff in a case. 
 MedMal:  1 if a case involved medical malpractice; 0 otherwise. 
 Tokyo:  1 if a case was decided by the Tokyo District Court; 0 otherwise. 
 Osaka:  1 if a case was decided by the Osaka District Court; 0 otherwise. 
 
 2.  Judge-level variables. --  
 Productivity:  Number of decisions published per year on the bench, 1995-2004.  
This includes all decisions, not just those in malpractice. 
 High Productivity:  1 if Productivity is greater than 2; 0 otherwise. 
 U Tokyo:  1 if a judge graduated from the University of Tokyo; 0 otherwise. 
                     
5 One case per month, generally the last civil damage action decided that month. 
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 U Kyoto:  1 if a judge graduated from the University of Kyoto; 0 otherwise. 
 Hitotsubashi U:  1 if a judge graduated from Hitotsubashi University; 0 
otherwise. 
 Elite U:  1 if a judge graduated from one of the three top national universities 
(University of Tokyo, University of Kyoto, and Hitotsubashi University); 0 otherwise. 
 Flunks:  the number of years a judge failed the entrance examination to the LRTI, 
estimated by a judge's year of birth. 
 Low Flunks:  1 if Flunks is less than 2; 0 otherwise. 
 TDC Start:  1 if a judge started his career at the Tokyo District Court; 0 
otherwise. 
 Seniority:  Number of years since graduation from the LRTI.  
 Judicial Expertise:  Number of published medical malpractice decisions (in this 
dataset) in which judge participated before an opinion. 
 
 3.  Court-level variables (for Figure 1). -- 
 Av Delay:  Mean time from filing to decision for ordinary civil cases, 1998, by 
district court. 
 Case98/Judge:  Number of ordinary civil cases per judge, 1998, by district court. 
 
III.  Measured Judicial Talent
A.  Introduction:
 When the Secretariat hires a new class of judges, it has available to it three sets of 
information about the talent each new hire brings to the job:  (a) it knows the selectivity 
of the university he attended; (b) it knows his age, and from it can estimate the number of 
times he failed the LRTI exam; and (c) because LRTI students work as interns in the 
courts, it has direct information about the quality of the work he produces.   
 Traditionally, the Secretariat has taken those new judges that it considered most 
promising and started them with a three-year stint at the Tokyo District Court.  Thereafter, 
it circulated them through a variety of posts.  At least initially, however, it started them in 
Tokyo.   
 I have access to some but not all of the information available to the Secretariat.  I 
know the university a judge attended (item (a)).  Like the administrative office, I can 
estimate the number of times he failed the LRTI exam (item (b)).  And although I do not 
directly know how well he performed during his LRTI internship (item (c)), I do know 
whether the Secretariat started him at the Tokyo District Court.  Given that it decided the 
initial posting on the basis of all three factors, that posting gives me an indirect measure 
even of a judge's performance at the LRTI. 
 
B.  University Selectivity: 
 The most selective Japanese universities choose their students exclusively through 
a blindly graded examination.  For most of the post-war period, the three universities with 
the most selective law departments have been the University of Tokyo, the University of 
Kyoto, and Hitotsubashi University.  Among the 706 judges in my basic dataset, 22 
percent attended the University of Tokyo, 6 percent attended Kyoto, and 1 percent 
attended Hitotsubashi University.  Among the 89 students from the class of 1976, 16 
percent attended Tokyo, 20 percent attended Kyoto, and 2 percent attended Hitotsubashi.   
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 Imperfectly to be sure, the entrance examinations to these schools test a student's 
basic cognitive skills and industriousness.  In part, the examinations select for the ability 
to solve difficult problems accurately and quickly.  Not to put too fine a point on it, they 
select for intelligence.  In part as well, they select for a willingness to study hard and long.  
The less intelligent students will not pass these exams no matter how hard they study, but 
even brilliant students will not pass them unless they study hard.   
 
C.  LRTI Pass Rate:
 During the years at stake, the entrance examination to the LRTI tested much the 
same skills as the university entrance exam.  Like the universities, the LRTI admitted its 
students primarily on the basis of a blindly graded examination.  It admitted about 500 
(recently changed).  Given the number who applied, this yielded a pass rate that varied 
from 1 to 3 percent. 
 Because of the low pass rate, most LRTI applicants never passed and those who 
did pass did so only after many tries.  The repeated failures appear in the age at which a 
student graduated from the LRTI.  One who passed while still in college would graduate 
from the LRTI at age 24.  Among the 706 judges in the dataset, only 21 managed this feat.   
 Students who pass selective university admissions tests also tend to pass the LRTI 
exam.  The graduates of Tokyo, Kyoto and Hitotsubashi Universities, for example, failed 
the exam only 3.24 times; the other judges failed it 4.01 times (the difference is 
significant at the 99 percent level).  In the private sector, lawyers typically failed it 6.57 
times (Nakazato, Ramseyer & Rasmusen, 2010).  Of the 21 judges who passed the exam 
on their first try, 48 percent attended one the three elite schools.  Of the 99 judges who 
passed it on one of their first two tries, 43 percent attended them.   
 
D.  Initial Appointment:
 For most of the post-war period, the Secretariat started the new recruits it found 
most promising at the Tokyo District Court (Ramseyer & Rasmusen, 2006).  As a result, 
an initial appointment to that court signaled "fast-track" status.  Predictably, judges on 
this fast track tended to have attended selective schools and passed the LRTI exam 
quickly.   
 Of the 706 judges in the medical malpractice dataset, 163 began at the Tokyo 
District Court.  Among those Tokyo-starters, 47 percent attended Tokyo, Kyoto, or 
Hitotsubashi University.  Among the rest, only 24 percent did.  The TDC starters failed 
the LRTI exam 2.94 times; the rest failed it 4.04 times.  Both differences are significant 
at the 99 percent level. 
 In the first column of Table 3 Panel A, I regress (through probit) an initial 
appointment to the Tokyo District Court on a judge's university, on the number of times 
he failed the LRTI exam, and (since the ratio of Tokyo openings to the number of new 
hires changed over time) his Seniority.  As the numbers above suggest, graduates of the 
University of Tokyo and judges who failed the LRTI exam the fewest times were most 
likely to start at the Tokyo District Court.   
 [Include Table 3 about here.] 
 In Panel B, I run the same regression on all judges hired in 1976.  The coefficient 
on Flunks remains strongly negative.  Given the smaller sample size, the university 
variables are no longer significant. 
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IV.  Ability and Productivity
 If (1) universities, the LRTI, and the Secretariat select students, lawyers, and 
judges for intelligence and effort, (2) highly intelligent, hard-working judges work more 
productively than others, and (3) those most talented judges do not disproportionately 
promote settlements, then Elite U, Flunks, and TDC Start should correlate with 
measured Productivity.  They do.  The correlation between Productivity and each of the 
three measures is .17, -.20, and .14 (with each significant at the 99 percent level).   
 The more talented judges (measured by the judge-level variables used here) 
publish substantially more opinions.  The judges who attended one of the top three 
universities published 5.19 opinions per year (all opinions, not just those in malpractice), 
while the rest published 3.13.  Those who passed the LRTI exam on one of their first two 
tries published 6.92 opinions, while the others published 3.23.  And those who started at 
the Tokyo District Court published 5.18 opinions while the others published 3.32.  Again, 
each of these differences is significant at the 99 percent level. 
 In Table 4 Panel A, I regress Productivity on these various background 
characteristics.  Each of the three talent variables is strongly significant, whether I run the 
regression on a univariate basis or with all variables together.  To avoid any bias created 
by selecting judges from published opinions, in Panel C I run the same regressions on the 
Class of 1976.  The coefficient on Elite U becomes insignificant, but the rest of the 
results remain. 
 [Include Table 4 about here.] 
 Perhaps, however, the higher publication rates for these elite judges reflect not 
their talent but their post.  Perhaps, in other words, the Secretariat disproportionately 
appoints its most talented judges to Tokyo. 6   Suppose further  that litigants 
disproportionately file the most newsworthy cases in the big cities.  If so, then the private 
reporters will disproportionately publish Tokyo and Osaka cases.  If the courts appoint 
their most talented judges to these cities, then Productivity would correlate with the 
measures of talent even if the talented judges wrote no more opinions than anyone else. 
 To address this possibility, I add current appointment in Tokyo as an independent 
variable.  Importantly, in Panel A Column (5) both the set of three talent variables and 
Tokyo are statistically significant.  Tokyo judges publish more than the others, even if I 
hold judicial talent constant, but the more talented judges publish more than the others, 
even if I hold appointment to Tokyo constant. 
 When I divide the dataset into Tokyo judges and others (Panel B), talent remains 
important.  Even among the judges appointed to Tokyo courts, the more talented publish 
more opinions than the rest (Column (1)).  Among the judges outside Tokyo, the more 
talented publish more than the others as well (Column (2)).   
 
V.  Speed
A.  Introduction: 
                     
6 After all, it does appoint them there for their initial post.  In Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3, I run 
the same regression as the Column (1) initial-posting regression, but use as the dependent variable whether 
a senior judge (i.e., one no longer in his initial post) spent any time during 1995-97 in either the Tokyo or 
the Osaka courts.  The results:  Tokyo and Osaka judges are indeed more talented than the others. 
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 What accounts for the speed at which judges decide the cases they handle?  The 
summary statistics identify three phenomena relevant here:  (a) malpractice cases take 
longer than other cases (Table 2 Panel A); (b) Tokyo courts decide malpractice cases 
faster than other courts (Table 2 Panel A); and (c) courts have steadily increased the 
speed with which they decide malpractice cases (Table 1, Table 2 Panel A). 
 
B.  Preliminary Hypotheses:
 Before turning to the judge-level inquiry, consider three simple hypotheses that 
might explain the last two phenomena.  First, might Tokyo courts decide cases faster 
because they enjoy a lower per-judge workload? 7   Tokyo represents the business, 
political, and demographic hub of the country.  Although the courts there hear more cases, 
perhaps the Secretariat staffs it more generously.  If Tokyo judges have a lower workload 
than other judges, perhaps that difference explains the faster turn-around? 
 The explanation does not work.  In Figure 1, I plot mean Time-to-Judgment for 
each of the fifty district courts on the vertical axis.  On the horizontal axis, I plot 
Case98/Judge -- the 1998 mean caseload per judge.  The number of judges in each court 
ranged from 7 to 243, with a mean of 22.  The number of cases cleared ranged from 337 
to 36,263, with a mean of 3,134.  Cases98/Judge ranged from 37 to 265, with a mean of 
132.  And mean Time-to-Judgment for each court ranged from .54 to 1.54, with a mean 
of .79. 
 [Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
 Figure 1 shows no court-level relation between Time-to-Judgment and workload.  
A simple regression yields a coefficient of .0000165 on Cases98/Judge with a t-statistic 
of .04 and an R-squared of 0.00.  The result is consistent with Beenstock & Haitovsky's 
(2004) findings for Israel:  judges respond to lower workloads by reducing effort.  What 
is more, Tokyo judges did not have light workloads anyway.  Instead, they had a 
workload of 149, and a mean Time-to-Judgment of 0.74.  By both metrics, they stood 
solidly in the middle of the pack. 
 Second, might the change over time reflect institutional reform?  In 2001, Tokyo 
and several of the major urban courts introduced specialized medical malpractice panels.  
Perhaps the pace of malpractice litigation increased because the courts delegated cases to 
specialists? 
 This explanation does not work either.  Specialized panels may or may not 
increase speed, but they do not explain the trend in Tables 1 and 2.  The courts introduced 
the panels in 2001.  Given average Time-to-Judgment in malpractice cases of two to 
three years, any effect from the panels would not begin to appear in the data until 2003 or 
2004.  According to Tables 1 and 2, adjudicatory speed increases steadily from 1995 to 
2004. 
 Third, perhaps Time-to-Judgment fell because of increased settlement rates.  The 
Time-to-Judgment figures in Table 2 Panel A are from the published opinions, and 
obviously exclude settlements.  Those in Table 1, however, represent times for all closed 
cases.  If settlement rates rose (for whatever reason), perhaps that rise explains the 
increasing pace in Table 1? 
                     
7 Tokyo cases could also be easier, though I have no reason to expect this. 
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 This explanation works no better than the others.  As the fourth column  in Table 
1 shows, settlement rates did not increase.  Necessarily, they explain no trend in Time-to-
Judgment.  
 
C.  Judge-Level Hypotheses: 
 1.  Summary statistics. -- If (as Section IV shows) the most talented judges 
publish more cases than the others, then they might also decide them more quickly than 
the others.  All else equal, one might think that those who published more opinions per 
year (Productivity) would tend to decide each opinion more quickly (Time-to-
Judgment) -- if cases/year rose, then years/case should fall.  In fact, of course, all else is 
never equal -- hence the empirical issue at stake here. 
 Over the dataset as a whole, some evidence does indeed tie talent to adjudicatory 
speed.  The correlation between Time-to-Judgment and Low Flunks (passing the LRTI 
on one of the first two tries) is -.06 (significant at the 95 percent level).  Its correlation to 
TDC Start is -.08 (significant at the 99 percent level).  And its correlation with High 
Productivity is -.12 (significant at the 99 percent level).  The correlation between Elite U 
and adjudicatory speed, however, is insignificant.   
 Additionally, consider some basic contrasts.  Those judges who failed the LRTI 
fewer than two times (Low Flunks = 1) decide cases in 3.73 years, while the others take 
4.12 years.  Those who started at the Tokyo District Court decide cases in 3.73 years, 
while the others decide them in 4.16 years.  And those with High Productivity decide 
them in 3.86 years, while the others decide in 4.40.  The first difference is significant at 
the 95 percent level, the other two at the 99 percent level. 
 
 2.  Which judge? -- Judges decide the significant civil cases, however, on three-
judge panels.  Probably, one of the judges on the panel does most of the work.  Because 
all three sign the opinion, they themselves do not disclose who did.  Instead, they merely 
list themselves by seniority, from oldest to youngest.  
 Plausibly, the panels might assign the job of writing the opinion by seniority.  
They might assign it to the youngest judge or, just as plausibly, assign it to the oldest.  In 
Table 5, I regress Time-to-Judgment on judge-level variables, on the amount at stake in 
a dispute, on court location, and on location interacted with a medical malpractice 
dummy.  In the first three columns, I calculate the results for the first-, second-, and third-
listed judges separately.  In the fourth column, I add judge-level variables for all three 
judges.  As a robustness check, in the fifth column I use all judges but cluster the errors 
by opinion.   
 [Include Table 5 about here.] 
 Note the substantially higher R2 for the first column:  the attributes of the most 
senior judge explain adjudicatory speed much more than those of the second- or third-
listed judge.  Indeed, the adjusted R2 is nearly twice as large in the first column than as in 
the others.  It is larger even than in regressions using the characteristics of all the judges 
(fourth and fifth columns).   
 
 3.  Judge-level characteristics. -- In Table 6, I examine judge-level determinants 
of judicial speed.  Toward that end, I regress Time-to-Judgment on a variety of judge-
specific variables.  Given the results of Table 5, I limit the data to the most senior judge 
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on a panel.  In Column (1), I use Elite U, Low Flunks, and TDC Start.  In Column (2), I 
use Productivity.  To capture possible judge-level expertise, in Column (3) I add 
Judicial Expertise:  the number of medical malpractice opinions a judge authored 
(within this dataset) before the given case.  In Column (4), I run the regression with all of 
the explanatory variables together.  And in all regressions, I include the Seniority of a 
judge, the amount demanded by the plaintiff at the outset, and a dummy variable equal to 
1 if the case involves medical malpractice.  Because many of the judges authored 
multiple opinions, in Columns (1) through (4) I use random judge effects.    
 [Include Table 6 about here.] 
 Talent indeed correlates with speed, albeit less consistently than with productivity.  
First, judges who passed the LRTI exam on one of their first two tries (Low Flunks) are 
fast.  Although the effect is only haphazardly statistically significant, the magnitude -- 
nearly a half-year faster -- is large.  Second, judges with High Productivity scores also 
decide cases faster.  Here, the effect is strongly significant statistically.  Third, judges 
with past experience in malpractice cases seem to decide current cases faster (more on 
this below).  Last, whether a judge attended an elite university or started at the Tokyo 
District Court is not associated with faster adjudicatory times. 
 Note several other effects.  First, speed tracks youth.  The older the judge, the 
longer he takes to decide a case.  For every ten years on the bench, he takes nearly a half-
year longer.  Second, cases with large amounts at stake require more time.  The effect is 
strongly significant statistically, but the magnitude is small:  every additional 10 million 
yen (about $100,000) a plaintiff demands slows the case by about half a month.  Third, 
malpractice cases take about two years more than the typical civil dispute.   
 I include two robustness checks in the table.  In Column (5), I run the full Column 
(4) specification without random judge effects.  The results track Column (4), but with 
higher significance levels.  In Column (6), I run the Column (4) specification with only 
the malpractice cases.  The significance levels are lower, but otherwise the results are 
largely the same.  
 
 4.  Expertise. -- (a) Introduction.  The declining Time-to-Judgment figures in 
Tables 1 and 2 suggest that experience matters:  the greater the experience, the faster the 
speed.  But which experience?  Is it  
 (i) judge:  the experience of the judge,  
 (ii) court:  the experience of the specific court, or  
 (iii) legal system:  the experience of the legal system as a whole?   
 Experience could plausibly matter at each of the three levels.  A judge who 
handled malpractice cases in the past might know the law, the type of records medical 
institutions kept, the kind of questions that arise about expert testimony.  A court that 
handled malpractice cases in the past might have developed institutional shortcuts to 
facilitate adjudication.  A legal system that amassed a body of malpractice cases could 
offer judges a detailed set of precedents by which to decide the routine questions.  
  
 (b) Tokyo.  The Tokyo courts handle malpractice disputes fastest.  As noted 
earlier, they do have the most talented judges, but the regressions hold measured talent 
constant.  According to Column (1) in Table 7, Tokyo courts decide malpractice cases a 
half-year faster than the other courts -- even if I hold talent constant.  Tokyo courts are 
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not faster generally:  Column (2) shows no Tokyo advantage in the non-malpractice cases.  
Instead, Tokyo courts are faster only in malpractice cases.   
 Earlier tables had anticipated this result.  Cursorily, Table 2 Panel A had 
suggested that Tokyo courts were faster in malpractice cases.  So too had the regressions 
in Table 5.  The coefficient on Tokyo itself was not significant:  Tokyo courts did not 
handle all cases quickly.  Instead, the coefficient on Tokyo was significant only when 
interacted with MedMal.  Medical malpractice cases took 1.2 years longer than other 
civil cases in Tokyo, but 1.9 years longer in Osaka and 2.1 years longer elsewhere.   
  
 (c) Judge- and court-level expertise.  And yet, the faster times in Tokyo need not 
imply that the court-level expertise is what matters.  Because the Tokyo courts hear the 
most malpractice cases, individual Tokyo judges will have more malpractice experience 
than judges elsewhere.  The faster time in Tokyo could simply reflect the effect of their 
judge-level experience. 
 In precisely that vein, Table 6 suggests that judge-level expertise does indeed 
matter:  Judicial Expertise (measured as the number of malpractice opinions a judge has 
published in the past) affects the time it takes a judge to decide a malpractice case in the 
present.  Even as judges rotate in and out of Tokyo, those with the most experience seem 
to decide the cases fastest.  Perhaps, the table seems to suggest, the crucial learning 
occurs at the level of the judge. 
 Recall, however, the definition of Judicial Expertise:  the number of prior 
malpractice cases a judge has decided within this dataset.  To construct the dataset, I 
examine all malpractice opinions from 1995 to 2004.  Obviously, the Judicial Expertise 
variable -- as defined for this dataset -- will increase from 1995 to 2004.  According to 
Table 1, however, adjudicatory time in malpractice cases fell steadily over 1995-2004.  
Potentially, the significant coefficient on Judicial Expertise might capture the general 
decline in Time-to-Judgment for malpractice cases over the period. 
 In Column (3), I limit the data to the malpractice cases, and add year variables.  
Note several observations.  First, the coefficient on Judicial Expertise is no longer 
significant.  Once I include dummy variables for the year of decision, the significance of 
the Judicial Expertise variable disappears.  Apparently, its significance in Column (1) 
did not reflect the importance of any judge-level expertise.  Instead, it captured the effect 
of the secular decline in Time-to-Judgment more generally.   
 Second, the coefficients on the year dummies are economically large and 
statistically significant.  The omitted year is 2004.  Compared to the Time-to-Judgment 
in 2004, the Time-to-Judgment in 1995 is nearly two full years longer.  That time 
gradually declined to about one year by 2000, and continued to fall thereafter.  Indeed, 
after 2000 the difference with the Time-to-Judgment in 2004 was no longer statistically 
significant. 
 In Column (4), I limit the dataset to those judges with no prior opinions in a 
malpractice cases (Judicial Expertise = 0).  Note that the pattern of coefficients on the 
year dummies is very close to those in Column (3).  Even among those judges with no 
apparent experience in malpractice, the Time-to-Judgment in malpractice cases fell 
steadily from 1995 to 2004.  The experience that mattered was not personal.  It was 
institutional.   
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 (d) Which court?  Regressions (3) and (4) in Table 7 suggest that the experience 
that matters is institutional rather than individual.  That said, the statement leaves 
unanswered the question of which institution, and how?  Is it the experience of the 
particular court?  Or does experience diffuse across court lines? 
 To explore this question, in Regressions (5) and (6), I divide the database between 
Tokyo and other courts.  Given that plaintiffs bring one in three malpractice claims in 
Tokyo, the experience is overwhelmingly Tokyo experience.  Yet Times-to-Judgment 
do not decline in Tokyo:  in Regression (5), only two of the coefficients on year dummies 
are significant, and the coefficients themselves show no pattern over time.  Instead, the 
decline occurs in the courts outside Tokyo:  the coefficients in Regression (6) for the 
years before 2001 are large and all statistically significant.   
 In short, expertise matters, but it crosses jurisdictional lines.  Tokyo courts have 
long handled the most malpractice cases.  They accumulated precedent and devised ways 
to handle the complex evidentiary questions raised.  As of the mid-1990s, they were 
substantially faster than courts elsewhere.   
 Over the succeeding decade, other courts apparently piggy-backed on the 
expertise and precedent that the Tokyo courts had developed.  The lessons learned in 
Tokyo diffused across the national court system as a whole.  Malpractice litigation in 
Tokyo was already the fastest in the country in 1995.  Its speed did not increase over the 
next decade.  Instead, the speed outside Tokyo increased as the other courts apparently 
learned from the expertise and precedent that the Tokyo courts had amassed. 
   
VI.  Conclusions
 With data from the Japanese courts, I study the determinants of productivity and 
speed.  Toward that end, I examine all 348 district-court civil medical malpractice 
opinions published between 1995 and 2004.  I add 120 randomly selected civil judgments 
from the same period, and also examine all judges hired in 1976.   
 Talent matters.  The most productive judges are those who attended the most 
selective universities, who passed the bar exam most quickly, and who were chosen by 
the courts for an elite career track.  Unambiguously, they publish the most opinions.   
 The most talented judges are also faster.  Speed does not have quite the 
correlation to talent that productivity does, but the correlation is there nonetheless.  
Judges with the strongest backgrounds decide cases with the most dispatch.   
 Experience also matters, but at an institutional level.  The Tokyo District Court 
has long handled the most malpractice cases, and has long decided them most quickly.  It 
does not handle all disputes quickly -- it shows no advantage in the non-malpractice cases.  
And yet, the Tokyo District Court did not further increase its speed in malpractice cases 
during the decade.  From 1995 to 2004, mean Times-to-Judgment in malpractice cases 
did fall, but not in Tokyo.  Instead, they fell elsewhere.  The lessons learned in Tokyo 
travelled across jurisdictional lines, and Times-to-Judgment in other courts fell as well. 
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Table 1: 
Medical Malpractice Cases 
 
 
 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   
  Cases  Cases  Court      Filing to 
 Filed Closed Decisions   (3)/(2)     Judgment . 
1998 632 582 232 .399 2.93 yr. 
1999 678 569 230 .404 2.88 
2000 795 691 305 .441 2.97 
2001 824 722 334 .463 2.72 
2002 906 869 386 .444 2.58 
2003 1003 1035 406 .392 2.31 
2004 1110 1004 405 .403 2.28 
 
 
 
 
 Sources:  Saiko saiban sho, ed., Iji kankei sosho jiken no shori 
jyokyo oyobi heikin shinri kikan [Circumstances of Disposition and 
Average Trial Length in Medical Litgation], www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/ 
about/iinkai/izikankei/toukei_01.html (accessed, Jan. 14, 2010); Saiko 
saiban sho, ed., Iji kankei sosho jiken no shukoku bunbetsu kizai kensu 
oyobi sono wariai [Medical Litigation Cases, by Number and Fraction of 
Final Disposition], www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/about/iinkai/izikankei/ 
toukei_02.html (accessed, Jan. 14, 2010). 
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Table 2:   
Reported Opinion Database -- Selected Summary Statistics 
 
 
A.  Filing to Judgment Times 
 
    All     .    Tokyo    .
  Med Mal  Non-MM   Med Mal  Non-MM  . 
1995 5.00 (42) 3.11 (9) 4.59 (17) * 
1996 3.93 (41) 1.92 (12) 3.36 (14) 1.29 (7) 
1997 4.61 (33) 3.50 (10) 3.33 (12) * 
1998 4.84 (38) 2.30 (10) 3.29 (7) *  
1999 5.13 (23) 1.75 (12) *  * 
2000 4.36 (45) 1.83 (12) 2.83 (6) * 
2001 3.70 (44) 2.67 (12) 3.33 (18) * 
2002 3.55 (29) 2.64 (11) 3.22 (9) * 
2003 3.90 (29) 1.92 (12) 3.36 (11) 1.67 (6) 
2004 3.38 (16) 1.78 (9) *  * 
 
  
 Notes:  Mean filing-to-judgment times, in years, followed by number of 
observations in parentheses.  * Five or fewer observations.   
 
 
B.  Judicial Productivity 
 
(All judges) n Min Max Median Mean 
All Cases 705 .10 77.33 2.40 3.75 
   Low Flunks 99 .20 77.33 3.25 6.92*** 
   Elite U 209 .10 77.33 2.63 5.19*** 
   TDC Start 162 .13 77.33 3.00 5.18*** 
 
Tokyo 212 .40 46.86 3.35 4.82*** 
   Low Flunks 37 .40 46.86 4.44 8.18*** 
   Elite U 79 .70 46.86 3.63 6.42*** 
   TDC Start 96 .40 46.86 3.00 5.12 
 
 
C.  Time to Judgment
 
(First judge only) n Min Max Median Mean 
All Cases 441 0 11 4 3.79 
   Low Flunks 102 0 9 4 3.58 
   Elite U 170 0 11 3.50 3.85 
   TDC Start 93 0 9 3.00 3.68 
   High Prod'y 364 0 11 3.00 3.65*** 
 
Tokyo 136 0 10 3.00 3.13*** 
   Low Flunks 34 0 7 3.00 2.85 
   Elite U 61 0 7 3.00 3.23 
   TDC Start 52 0 7 3.00 3.13 
   High Prod'y 125 0 10 3.00 2.99*** 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
 
 
(First judge only) n Min Max Median Mean 
Medical Malpractice 
   All Cases 339 0 11 4.00 4.27*** 
      Low Flunks 82 0 9 4.00 3.95* 
      Elite U 133 0 11 4.00 4.32 
      TDC Start 78 0 9 4.00 4.00* 
      High Prod'y 272 0 11 4.00 4.22 
 
   Tokyo  101 0 10 3.00 3.53*** 
      Low Flunks 23 0 7 3.00 3.22 
      Elite U 48 0 7 3.00 3.48 
      TDC Start 42 0 7 3.00 3.43 
      High Prod'y 90 0 10 3.00 3.39*** 
 
 
     Notes:  *, **, *** -- Means are different from the values for the contrary case 
(e.g., Low Flunks = 1 compared to Low Flunks = 0) at levels statistically significant 
at 10, 5, and 1 % (one-tailed test). 
 
     Source:  Dai ichi hoki shuppan, ed., Hanrei taikei [All Judicial Cases] 
(Tokyo:  Dai ichi hoki shuppan, 2009) (database). 
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Table 3:  Appointments to Tokyo and Osaka 
 
 
A.  Basic Dataset: 
 
Dependent variable: TDC Start Tokyo  Osaka    . 
Univ Tokyo  .864 (6.32)*** .232 (1.62) -.686 (3.41)*** 
Univ Kyoto  -.188 (0.69) -.094 (0.42) .474 (2.20)** 
Hitotsubashi U  -.265 (0.44) 1.133 (2.11)** @ 
Flunks   -.165 (5.16)*** .019 (0.66) -.074 (2.14)** 
TDC Start   .339 (2.20)** -.202 (1.04) 
Seniority  -.026 (3.54)*** .000 (0.01) -.323 (1.24) 
 
n  575 497  491 
Pseudo R2  .14 .02  .07 
 
 
B.  Supplementary Class of 76 Dataset:
 
Dependent variable: TDC Start Tokyo Osaka  . 
Univ Tokyo -.175 (0.34) -.112 (0.27) -.520 (0.94) 
Univ Kyoto -.540 (1.14) .184 (0.48) .666 (1.77)* 
Hitotsubashi U .696 (0.60) + @ 
Flunks -.633 (3.76)*** -.194 (2.16)** -.185 (1.78)* 
TDC Start  .950 (2.32)** .005 (0.01) 
 
n .29 .17 .13 
Pseudo R2 89 87 87 
 
 
     Note:  *, **, *** -- significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.  For 
Tokyo and Osaka in Panel A, Seniority > 3 only to avoid capturing judges who 
are still in their first TDC appointment.  Judicial classes without 
university information in the ZSKS are dropped.  Regression is Probit.  @ -- 
Dropped (predicts failure perfectly).  + -- Dropped (predicts success 
perfectly).  Tokyo and Osaka in 76 dataset are any judges who spend any time 
in those courts during 1995-97. 
 
     Sources:  See Table 2. 
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Table 4: 
Judicial Productivity 
 
 
 
A.  Basic Regressions: 
   (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)   (5) 
Dependent variable:  Productivity         . 
Elite U 2.060      .907 
 (4.60)***     (1.97)** 
Flunks   -.478    -.275 
   (5.24)***    (2.99)*** 
TDC Start    1.865   1.276 
    (3.82)***   (2.41)** 
Tokyo     1.537 1.094 
     (3.43)*** (2.35)** 
Seniority       .132 
       (6.16)*** 
 
Adj R2 .03  .04 .02 .02  .12 
n 705  683 705 705  683 
  
 
 
B.  Regressions by Region: 
    (1)    (2) 
Dependent variable:  Productivity         . 
Elite U  1.661  .497 
  (2.05)**  (0.89) 
Flunks  -.352  -.257 
  (1.91)**  (2.41)** 
TDC Start  .937  1.852 
  (1.03)  (2.65)*** 
Seniority  .190  .107 
  (4.29)***  (4.31)*** 
 
Region  Tokyo   Excludes 
  only  Tokyo 
Adj R2  .15  .08 
n  207  476 
 
 
C.  Class of 76 Dataset:
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
Dependent variable:  Productivity                             . 
Elite U .322    .005 
 (0.40)    (0.01) 
Flunks  -.405   -.200 
  (2.34)**   (0.93) 
TDC Start   2.991  2.404 
   (3.49)***  (2.40)** 
Tokyo    1.477 .452 
    (1.94)* (0.56) 
 
Adj R2 -.01 .06 .15 .04 .13 
n 67 67 67 67 67 
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Table 4 (Cont'd) 
 
 
 
     Notes:  *, **, *** -- significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.  Panel C 
excludes judge with Productivity over 20.  "Tokyo" gives any judge stationed in 
Tokyo for any period during 1995-97. 
 
     Sources:  See Table 2. 
Talent Matters:  Page 22 
 
Table 5: 
Court Delays:  Which Judge Matters? 
 
 
 
Dependent variable:  Time to Judgment               . 
Elite U .276 .065 .386 .149 .149 
 (1.40) (0.27) (1.08) (1.07) (1.07) 
Low Flunks -.464 .416 -.239 -.242 -.242 
 (2.01)** (0.82) (0.68) (1.38) (1.39) 
TDC Start -.050 -.103 -.377 -.076 -.076 
 (0.20) (0.36) (0.96) (0.48) (0.57) 
Productivity -.021 .027 .018 -.006 -.006 
 (1.44) (0.89) (0.34) (0.47) (0.47) 
Seniority .048 .021 .023 .003 .003 
 (2.93)*** (1.01) (0.76) (0.50) (0.83) 
Demand Value+ .507 .492 .502 .536 .536 
 (4.48)*** (3.65)*** (3.28)*** (7.27)*** (3.14)*** 
Tokyo -.249 -1.882 -1.733 -1.139 -1.139 
 (0.58) (2.46)** (2.09)** (3.33)*** (2.35)** 
Osaka -.312 -.400 -.805 -.807 -.807 
 (0.58) (0.39) (0.69) (1.84)** (1.44) 
Med Mal * Tokyo 1.195 2.219 2.105 1.838 1.838 
 (3.02)*** (3.47)*** (3.12)*** (6.29)*** (5.72)*** 
Med Mal * Osaka 1.874 1.470 1.690 2.191 2.191 
 (3.45)*** (1.54) (1.52) (5.27)*** (4.82)*** 
Med Mal * Other 2.060  1.614 1.393 1.882 1.882 
 (6.60)*** (3.08)*** (2.66)*** (8.00)*** (4.44)*** 
 
n 434 331 299 1064 1064 
Adj. R2 .26 .14 .14 .19 .20@ 
 
Data: First  Second Third  All All 
 Judge Judge Judge  
 
Regression: OLS OLS OLS OLS  OLSw/ 
     errors clustered 
     by opinion 
 
 
     Notes:  *, **, *** -- significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.  + -- given 
as x 108.  @ -- R2. 
 
     Sources:  See Table 2. 
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Table 6:   
Judge-Level Determinants of Delays (I) 
 
 
Dependent variable:  Time to judgment               . 
Elite U .175   .199 .219 .321 
 (0.76)   (0.86) (1.10) (1.17) 
Low Flunks -.459   -.395 -.436 -.494 
 (1.70)*   (1.43) (1.87)* (1.58) 
TDC Start -.126   -.051 -.215 -.150 
 (0.46)   (0.18) (0.91) (0.47) 
Productivity  -.027  -.024 -.024 -.020 
  (1.84)*  (1.53) (1.70)* (1.03) 
Judicial Exper   -.202 -.204 -.287 -.215 
   (2.02)** (2.06)** (2.76)*** (2.05)** 
Seniority .043 .042 .042 .049 .050 .050 
 (2.50)** (2.53)** (2.55)** (2.87)*** (3.07)*** (2.19)** 
Demand Value+ .495 .498 .513 .501 .573 .528 
 (4.71)*** (4.76)*** (4.88)*** (4.81)*** (5.02)*** (3.50)*** 
Med Mal 1.832 1.769 1.930 1.864 2.000 
 (8.00)*** (7.67)*** (8.29)*** (7.94)*** (8.06)*** 
 
Regression: Random Random Random Random OLS Random 
 Judge Judge Judge Judge  Judge 
 Effects Effects Effects Effects  Effects 
 
Dataset: All cases All cases All cases All cases All cases Med mal 
 
R2: .24 .24 .24 .26 .26 .09 
n: 434 434 434 434 434 333 
 
     Notes:  First judge in panel only.  *, **, *** -- significant at 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels.  + -- given as x 108.   
 
     Sources:  See Table 2. 
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Table 7:   
Judge-Level Determinants of Delays (II) 
 
  (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent variable:  Time to judgment               .
Elite U .355 -.351 .317 .230 -.417 .616 
 (1.31) (0.86) (1.20) (0.76) (0.86) (1.92)* 
Lo Flunks -.533 -.269 -.632 -.815 -.406 -.730 
  (1.73)* (0.48) (2.11)** (2.44)** (0.73) (2.03)** 
TDC Start .048 .339 .111 .264 .333 .067 
  (0.15) (0.62) (0.35) (0.73) (0.65) (0.16) 
Productivity -.018 -.034 -.023 -.009 -.059 -.017 
 (0.95) (1.30) (1.22) (0.46) (1.27) (0.81) 
Judicial Exper -.211  -.081  -.067 -.151 
  (2.01)**  (0.72)  (0.41) (0.93) 
Seniority .052 .042 .052 .067 .122 .033 
 (2.31)** (1.58) (2.32)** (2.63)*** (2.38)** (1.31) 
Demand Value+ .480 .545 .546 .735 .588 .694 
 (3.16)*** (3.80)*** (3.47)*** (2.95)*** (2.19)** (3.40)*** 
Tokyo -.688 -.133 -.784 -1.012 
  (2.43)** (0.33) (2.79)*** (3.11)*** 
1995   1.759 1.974 1.663 1.995 
   (2.98)*** (2.50)** (1.78)* (2.64)*** 
1996   .883 1.516 .117 1.231 
   (1.52) (1.86)* (0.13) (1.66)* 
1997   1.448 .918 .880 2.005 
   (2.40)** (1.01) (0.94) (2.56)** 
1998   1.470 1.841 .354 2.041 
   (2.56)*** (2.24)** (0.36) (2.83)*** 
1999   1.213 1.625 2.211 1.539 
   (1.96)** (1.89)* (1.61) (2.06)** 
2000   .949 .913 .200 1.433 
   (1.68)* (1.10) (0.20) (2.03)** 
2001   .470 .848 -.240 .798 
   (0.82) (1.02) (0.28) (1.07) 
2002   .393 .785 -.103 .565 
   (0.69) (0.89) (0.12) (0.76) 
2003   .580 .737 -.181 .981 
   (0.98) (0.82) (0.20) (1.30) 
 
Regression: Random Random Random OLS Random Random 
 Judge Judge Judge  Judge Judge 
 Effects Effects Effects  Effects Effects 
 
Dataset: Medmal NonMM Medmal Medmal & Medmal & Medmal &  
    no JudExp Tokyo not Tokyo 
 
R2: .13 .20 .19 .22 .24 .16 
n: 333 101 333 194 99 234 
 
     Notes:  First judge in panel only.  *, **, *** -- significant at 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels.  + -- given as x 108.   
 
     Sources:  See Table 2. 
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Figure 1:   
Geographical Variation in Delays 
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     Notes:  Units of observation are the district courts.  Tokyo 
District Court has a delay of .74, and a case load of 149.   
 
     Sources:  Saiko saiban sho, ed., Shiho tokei nempo, 1 -- Minji, 
gyosei hen [Annual Report of Judicial Statistics, 1 -- Civil and 
Administrative] tab. 22-3 (Tokyo:  Saiko saiban sho jimu so kyoku, 
1998). 
 
 
 
